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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
TODD ALLEN PARKER, 
Defendant/Appellant, 
Case No. 920732-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1992). 
STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Relevant statutes, rules and constitutional provisions are 
set forth in Addendum A. 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue; Did the trial judge commit reversible error in 
refusing to order the return of fees paid by Defendant to a state run 
treatment facility after Defendant's conviction was reversed on 
appeal and the case against him was dismissed in the trial court? 
Standard of Review; This issue involves a question of law 
which this Court reviews for correctness. See generally State v. 
Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781 n.3, 782 (Utah 1991); Scharf v. BMG Corp., 
700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
In an Information dated September 10, 1990, the State 
charged Defendant/Appellant Todd Allen Parker with three counts of 
Burglary, a second degree felony. R. 6-7. 
The trial court denied Appellant's motions to suppress and 
convicted Appellant as charged on all three counts following a bench 
trial held on March 7, 1991. R. 25. 
On April 5, 1991, the trial judge sentenced Appellant on 
each of the three counts. R. 26-9. Thereafter, Appellant appealed 
his convictions to this Court. 
In an Opinion dated June 12, 1992, this Court reversed all 
three of Appellant's convictions and remanded his case to the trial 
court. A copy of the Opinion in State v. Parker, 834 P.2d 592 (Utah 
App. 1992), is contained in Addendum B. 
On July 31, 1992, after the case was remanded to the trial 
court, the State moved to dismiss the charges against Appellant. 
R. 51. The trial court granted that motion. R. 51, 52. 
Thereafter, Appellant filed a "Motion for Return of Fine, Costs and 
Fees." R. 53. A copy of Appellant's "Motion for Return" is 
contained in Addendum C. 
The trial judge held hearings on August 28, 1992 and 
September 15, 1992 on Appellant's motion. R. 71-78. At each 
hearing, the trial judge continued the matter and ordered the State 
to make a decision as to the position it was taking on Appellant's 
motion. R. 73, 76. Thereafter, on September 15, 1992, the trial 
judge entered a minute entry which indicates that the State "will 
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stipulate to return the fines, but object to any monies returned for 
rehabilitation. The court so orders." R. 56. On October 16, 1992, 
the court entered its written order denying the return of the fees 
paid to Fremont Center. R. 59. A copy of that order is contained 
in Addendum D. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On April 5, 1991, the trial judge sentenced Appellant to 
concurrently serve one to fifteen years at the Utah State Prison on 
each of the counts and to pay a fine of $10,000 on each count. 
R. 26-9. The judge stayed the prison sentence and fine and placed 
Appellant on eighteen months probation under the supervision of the 
Utah State Department of Adult Probation and Parole. R. 26-9. 
The conditions of probation were that Appellant pay a fine 
of $800 and a 25 percent surcharge, make full restitution, obtain 
his G.E.D. degree, and enter and complete a psychological program at 
Salt Lake County Mental Health. R. 29. In addition, the judge 
ruled that if the probation department determined it was 
appropriate, Appellant was to attend and complete the live-in 
program at the state run Fremont Center. R. 29; T. April 5, 1991 at 
7-8.1 
1. Fremont Center is a state funded program which is run by the 
Department of Corrections. During sentencing, defense counsel took 
issue with the recommendation in the presentence report that 
Appellant go to the year or longer residential treatment program at 
the Fremont Center. T. April 5, 1991 at 3-4. Nevertheless, the 
trial judge indicated that Appellant was to go to that residential 
program as a term of probation if the probation department thought 
the program appropriate. 
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Appellant paid the required fine and attended the Fremont 
program. R. 73. While attending that program, Appellant paid $180 
per month for nine months to that program. R. 73. 
The State stipulated to the return of the fines paid by 
Appellant but apparently refused to stipulate to the return of the 
money paid for the treatment program. R. 56.2 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court committed reversible error in refusing to 
return fees paid by Appellant to a state run treatment facility as a 
condition of probation. After this Court reversed Appellant's 
convictions and the trial court dismissed the charges, the 
previously ordered sentence was no longer legal, and the trial court 
was required to order the return of any fees or fines paid by 
Appellant as a condition of probation, to the State. 
2. The basis for the State's position in the trial court is not 
clear from the record. Although the trial judge put the matter over 
until the afternoon of September 15, 1992, no hearing occurred that 
afternoon and defense counsel was not informed of and did not 
participate in any further proceedings on this issue. Nevertheless, 
the trial judge issued a minute entry on September 15, 1992, 
indicating that the State stipulated to the return of the fines but 
objected to returning fees paid to Fremont. R. 56. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT. THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN REFUSING TO RETURN 
FEES PAID BY APPELLANT AS A CONDITION OF PROBATION 
TO A STATE RUN TREATMENT PROGRAM. 
Although no Utah rule, statute or constitutional provision 
explicitly controls the issue raised in this case, a number of 
provisions provide guidance in assessing whether fees paid by 
Appellant to the state run Fremont program as a condition of 
probation should be returned when the conviction and sentence were 
vacated.3 
3. Although neither the parties nor trial judge stated that Fremont 
Center is a state run program, such information is common knowledge 
to trial judges, prosecutors and defense lawyers who often deal with 
persons who are sentenced to Fremont Center as a condition of 
probation. Indeed, the phone number for the Fremont Community 
Center is listed in the Utah State Government section of the 
telephone book under the heading "Corrections Department." See 
Addendum E. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 201(b) provides: 
A judicially noticed fact must be one not 
subject to reasonable dispute in that it is 
either (1) generally known within the territorial 
jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of 
accurate and ready determination by resort to 
sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be 
questioned. 
A judge can take judicial notice without being requested by either 
party to do so. Utah R. Evid. 201(c) (1993). Judicial notice is 
mandatory "if requested by a party and supplied with the necessary 
information." Utah R. Evid. 201(d) (1993). For a judge to take 
judicial notice, the matter must be (1) information of common or 
general knowledge; (b) well settled and "not doubtful or uncertain"; 
(c) "known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the 
court." DeFusion Co. v. Utah Liquor Control Comm'n, 613 P.2d 1120, 
1124 (Utah 1980). In sentencing a person to Fremont Center, the 
trial judge most certainly was aware of this common and certain 
knowledge that Fremont Center is run by the Department of 
Corrections. 
(continued) 
- 5 -
A. UTAH RULES AND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT REQUIRE 
THE RETURN OF THE FEES, 
Rule 22(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (1993) 
provides that "[t]he court may correct an illegal sentence, or a 
sentence imposed in an illegal manner, at any time," Because 
Appellant's conviction has been overturned and the charges 
dismissed, the sentence is illegal and must be corrected. See 
generally United States v. Lewis, 478 F.2d 835, 836 (5th Cir. 1973); 
("Since the district court was empowered to set aside the 
conviction, it could also correct the unlawful result of the 
conviction and require the repayment of money collected as fines."); 
State v. Danielson, 809 P.2d 937 (Alaska App. 1991); People v. 
Reqqel, 28 P. 955 (Utah 1892). 
Rule 28, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (1993) discusses 
"Disposition after appeal." It states: 
Rule 28. Disposition after appeal. 
(a) If a judgment of conviction is 
reversed, a new trial shall be held unless 
otherwise specified by the appellate court. 
Pending a new trial or other proceeding, the 
(footnote 3 continued) 
Furthermore, this Court has discretion to take judicial 
notice on appeal. Utah R. Evid. 201(c) (1993); Mel Trimble Real 
Estate v. Monte Vista Ranch, Inc., 758 P.2d 451 (Utah App. 1988). 
Because the proceedings below implicitly establish that the trial 
judge and parties were aware that Fremont Center is part of the 
Department of Corrections, judicial notice of that fact does not 
present a situation where the concept of judicial notice is used to 
circumvent the requirement that issues not be raised for the first 
time on appeal. See Id. at 455-6. 
Because the fact that Fremont Center is a state run program 
within the Department of Corrections is a matter of common knowledge 
to trial judges, prosecutors and defense lawyers, is not doubtful 
and is within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court, judicial 
notice of that fact is appropriate. 
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defendant shall be detained, or released upon 
bail, or otherwise restricted as the trial court 
on remand determines proper. If no further trial 
or proceeding is to be had a defendant in custody 
shall be discharged, and a defendant restricted by 
bail or otherwise shall be released from 
restriction and bail exonerated and any deposit of 
funds or property refunded to the proper person. 
The Fifth Amendment to the United States constitution 
provides that no person shall be "deprived of . . . property without 
due process of law." In United States v. Lewis, 342 F.Supp. 833, 
836 (E.D. La. 1972), affirmed 478 F.2d 835 (5th Cir. 1973), the 
Court held that the Fifth Amendment required the restitution of 
fines paid by a defendant where the defendant's conviction was 
subsequently vacated. 
The Fifth Amendment prohibition against the taking 
of one's property without due process of law 
demands no less than the full restitution of a 
fine that was levied pursuant to a conviction 
based on an unconstitutional law. Fairness and 
equity compel this result, and a citizen has the 
right to expect as much from his government, 
notwithstanding the fact that the government and 
the court were proceeding in good faith at the 
time of the prosecution. 
Lewis, 342 F.Supp. at 836; see also State v. Stein, 806 P.2d 346, 
347 (Alaska App. 1991), quoting United States v. Lewis, 342 F.Supp. 
at 836 (principles of equity and the Fifth Amendment require the 
return of fines paid by the defendant in excess of the amount 
allowed by law); accord State v. Danielson, 809 P.2d 937; Ex parte 
McCurley, 412 So.2d 1236, 1237-8 (Ala. 1982). 
Various other courts have held that fines and fees paid to 
the state as a condition of probation must be returned to the 
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defendant when a conviction is subsequently vacated.4 In State v. 
Sup. Ct.y 410 P.2d 502, 503-4 (Ariz. 1966), the court held a fine 
paid by a defendant in lieu of bond must be returned when the 
conviction is overturned on appeal. 
On a successful appeal the person charged is 
entitled to all the benefits of his success. 
. . . 
The fine paid in lieu of bond and possibly in lieu 
of confinement until he could post bond and until 
the appeal could be perfected, is to be restored 
to him. 
Id. 
In People v. Meyerowitz, 335 N.E.2d 1, 7 (111. 1975), the 
court held that the defendants were "entitled to a refund of the 
fines and costs they [] paid as a result of their void 
convictions." In reaching its decision, the court determined that 
the payment of a fine as a condition of probation is not voluntary 
since "willful refusal to pay the fine could have resulted in 
revocation of the probation and the incarceration of the 
defendant." Jd. The court stated: 
We are of the opinion that the money, having been 
received in payment of fines imposed as an 
incident to judgments of conviction, should be 
ordered refunded as an incident to the vacation of 
the judgments under which it was ordered. 
4. Appellant has been unable to find much case law directly 
discussing the return of fines or fees after a reversal on appeal. 
Instead, much of the case law arises in the context where a 
defendant has entered a guilty plea pursuant to a statute which is 
later found unconstitutional. See, e.g., People v. Meyerowitz, 335 
N.E.2d 1 (111. 1975); Ex parte McCurley, 412 So.2d 1236. The issue 
in such cases focuses on whether the defendant has a right to the 
return of fines or fees where he voluntarily pled guilty. Perhaps 
because of the obvious requirement that fines and fees must be 
returned where a conviction is reversed on appeal and the case 
dismissed on remand, little case law exists in that area. 
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335 N.E.2d at 8. 
In United States v. Lewis, 478 F.2d at 836, the court stated: 
Just as the imposition of a fine is an incident of 
a criminal conviction, so is the direction for 
repayment an incident to the vacating and setting 
aside of the conviction. 
Accord State v. Piekkola, 241 N.W.2d 563, 564 (S.C. 1976), reversed 
on other grounds, In re Estate of Erdmann, 447 N.W.2d 356, 359 (S.C. 
1989) ; see also Mossew v. United States, 266 F. 18 (2d Cir. 1920). 
The court's ability to correct an illegal sentence coupled 
with the Fifth Amendment protection require that fees paid to the 
state by a defendant in order to fulfill a condition of probation 
that the defendant attend a state run treatment program be refunded 
where the conviction is subsequently vacated. In the present case, 
where Appellant attended the state run Fremont program as a 
condition of probation, the trial court committed reversible error 
in refusing to refund the fees paid by Appellant to the State. 
B. ARTICLE I, SECTION 7 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION 
REQUIRES THE RETURN OF THE FEES. 
Article I, Section 7 of the Utah constitution provides that 
"[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without 
due process of law." That provision was adopted as part of the 
original Utah constitution in 1897 and has remained in effect 
throughout Utah's statehood. 
Although the language of Article I, Section 7 is identical 
to that of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States constitution, the Utah Supreme Court has recognized 
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that Article I, Section 7 provides greater due process protection in 
some contexts than does its federal counterpart. See State v. 
Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (greater scrutiny given to eyewitness 
identification testimony under state due process than under federal 
due process); Foote v. Board of Pardons, 808 P.2d 734 (Utah 1991) 
(inmate has right to state due process at Board of Pardons hearing 
even though no federal due process right exists at such hearings). 
In the present case, although Appellant did not articulate a 
distinct legal analysis under the Utah constitution, he did 
articulate his claim that retention of fees paid by him as a 
condition of probation to a state run residential program violated 
his right to due process under the state constitution. Although 
none of the cases relied upon in the previous section explicitly 
discuss a state constitutional analysis, they nevertheless support 
Appellant's state constitutional claim. See, e.g., United States v. 
Lewis, 478 F.2d 835; United States v. Lewis, 342 F.Supp. 833, 835; 
State v. Sup. Ct., 410 P.2d at 503-4; People v. Meyerowitz, 335 
N.E.2d at 7. 
The decisions to return fines and costs rely on fairness, 
equity and/or the constitutional proscription against deprivation of 
property without due process. The rationale for such decisions is 
equally applicable to a determination as to whether a procedure 
complies with state due process. Retention of the fees paid by 
Mr. Parker to a state run treatment program as a condition of 
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probation violates state due process under these circumstances where 
the conviction has been vacated. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse the 
trial court's order denying the return of fees paid to a state run 
treatment program as a condition of probation. 
SUBMITTED this cffi" day of June, 1993. 
<^^Ud£6/ 
JOAN C. WATT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
LISA J./REMAL 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, JOAN C. WATT, hereby certify that I have caused to be 
delivered eight copies of the foregoing to the Utah Court of 
Appeals, 400 Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84102, and four copies to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State 
Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this ^ y ^ d a y
 Qf June, 1993. 
JOAN C. WATT 
DELIVERED this day of June, 1993. 
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ADDENDUM A 
78-2a-& Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(2) Th^ Canrt of App^ gJg hag gpp j^fyc^  jr^ py ?r<'f^ nw ^^^ f^r7gjTTTfyiictirrn of 
i ii CifT'li KXLLm y appeals, over? 
CO appeals fenn a court of record in ^ wminai rnnm, except those involv-
ing a conviction o£ a first degree or ^[y^H felony? 
ARTICLE IL 
JUDICIAL NOTICE. 
Rule 201. Judicial notice of adjudicative facts. 
(a) Scope of rule. This rule governs only judicial nonce of adjudicative 
facts. 
(b) Kinds of facts. A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to 
reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the territo-
rial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determi-
nation by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. 
(c) When discretionary. A court may take judicial notice, whether re-
quested or not. 
(d) When mandatory. A court shall take judicial notice if requested by a 
party and supplied with the necessary information. 
(e) Opportunity to be heard. A party is entitled upon timely request to an 
opportunity to be heard as to the propriety of taking judicial notice and the 
tenor of the matter noticed. In the absence of prior notification, the request 
may be made after judicial notice has been tnk**, 
(f) Time of taking notice. Judicial notice may be taken at any stage of the 
proceeding. 
(g) Instructing jury. In a civil action or proceeding, the court shall in-
struct the jury to accept as conclusive any fact judicially noticed. In a criminal 
case, the court shall instruct the jury that it may, but is not required to, accept 
as conclusive any fact judicially noticed. 
Rule 22. Sentence, judgment and commitment. 
(a) Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty or plea of no contest, the 
court «han set a tune for frwpnrnig sentence which shall be not less than two 
nor more ^ a f f 30 days after the verdict or plea, rmifrss the court, with the: 
ooncnrrence of the V^frwdawg, otherwise orders. Pending sentence, the court 
may commit the A*tmAmT. or may continue or alter bail or recognizance. 
Before 'n?*?**""? sentence the court shall afford the defendant an opportu-
nity to T7«^ *» a statement ux his own behalf and to present any informanon in 
mitigation of mizushznent, or to show any legal cause wny sentence should nor 
be imposed. The prosecuting attorney shall also be given an opportunity to 
prgMn* any informanon m****™! to the imposition of sentence. 
(b) On the same grounds ***«* a ^Vf**"* may be tried in his absence, he 
may likewise be sentenced in his absence. If a rlefrnfiaTit tails to appear fixe 
sentence, a warrant tor his arrest may be issued by the court. 
(c) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty or plea of no contest, the court shall' 
jiHTw* sentence ar>r* «h«n enter a judgment of conviction which shall include 
the plea or the verdict, if any, and the sentence, Following imposition of 
j^ynwir* the court «h«n advise the ^ ^ " ^ of his right to appeal and the 
frmm within which any anpeal shall be died. 
(d) When a jail or onson sentence is imposed, tie court shall issue its 
commitment setting tbrth the sentence. The officer deiivermg the defendant to 
the jail or prison shall deliver a true cony of the commitment to the jail or 
pnson and snail make tus return on the commitment and file it with the court. 
(e> The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an 
illegal manner, at any ame. 
CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
Const. Amend V reads: 
Ho person shall be held to answer for a capital, 
or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment 
or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising 
in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, ?hen 
in actual service in time of War or public danger; 
nor shall any person be subject for the same offence 
to be cr^ ice puc in jeopardy of life or limb, nor shall 
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness 
against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor shall 
private property be taken for public use without, just 
compensation. 
A M E N D M E N T XIV 
Section 1* [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Rule 28. Disposition on appeaL 
(a) If a judgment of conviction is reversed* a new trial shall be held unless 
otherwise specified by the appellate court. Pending a new trial or other pro-
ceeding, the defendant shall be detained, or released upon bail, or otherwise 
restricted as the trial court on remand determines proper. If no further trial or 
proceeding is to be had a defendant in custody shall be discharged, and a 
defendant restricted by bail or otherwise shall be released firom restriction 
and bail exonerated and any deposit of funds or properly refunded to the 
proper person* 
(b) Upon affirmance by the appellate court, the judgment or order affirmed 
or modified shall be executed, 
(c) A party may, within 20 days, petition the appellate court for a rehear-
ing; During this 20-day period or iwmding disposition of a petition fig rehear* 
ing; and upon application of a party, the trial court may enter such orders as 
are necessary to insure the defendant's presence to comply with the judgment 
or make such other orders as are appropriate in the case. Upon final comple-
tion of an appeal, the entire record on appeal shall be remitted to the clerk of 
the lower court. 
(d) In proper cases, upon motion of any party, the remittitur may be stayed 
pending proceedings in the Supreme Court of the United States or another 
court. In such case, the appellate court or the trial court may make such 
orders in the case pending further proceedings as are necessary or appropri-
ate. 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
ABTICLE I 
S e c 7. [Due process of law.] 
%
 No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without dzxe process 
of law. 
ADDENDUM B 
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reverse and remand for reinstatement of 
the jury verdict and sentencing. 
GARFF and ORME, JJ., concur. 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Todd Allen PARKER, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 910265-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
June 12, 1992. 
Defendant was convicted in the Third 
District Court, Salt Lake County, Homer F. 
Wilkinson, J., of burglary of a dwelling, 
and he appealed. The Court of Appeals, 
Russon, J., held that police lacked required 
probable cause to arrest him so that his 
subsequent statements had to be sup-
pressed. 
Reversed and remanded. 
1. Automobiles <s»349(2) 
Reasonableness of traffic stop, which 
is limited seizure and more like investiga-
tive detention than custodial arrest, is as-
sessed under principles governing investi-
gative detentions based on whether offi-
cer's action was justified in it inception and 
whether action was reasonably related m 
scope to circumstances which justified ini-
tial interference. U.S.C.A. ConstAmends. 
4, 5. 
2. Automobiles e=>349(2) 
Officer had justification for initial stop 
of defendant where defendant was driving 
45 miles per hour in 25-mile per hour zone. 
3. Automobiles e»349(8) 
While police officer had discretion to 
stop defendant for traffic violation, arrest 
for burglary was not based on 
articulated suspicion where, at time < 
only fact that tied defendant to 
was presence of vehicle he was 
area near where crime occurred;, 
of vehicle, without more, did not j 
to reasonable suspicion. 
4. Automobiles «=>349(15) 
Police officer did not have disc 
remove defendant from his vehicle/! 
cuff him, and place him under arrestl 
witnessing defendant exceed speedy 
while entering driveway absent any i 
able articulable suspicion that defend 
was involved in earlier burglaries. ^ 
Joan C. Watt and James C. Bradsh 
Salt Lake City, for defendant and 
lant 
R. Paul Van Dam and Kris C. Leon 
Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and app 
Before BILLINGS, JACKSON and-
RUSSON, JJ. -s 
OPINION 
RUSSON, Judge: 
Todd Allen Parker appeals his conv 
tions of three counts of burglary ofjl. 
dwelling, a second degree felony, in vioW 
tion of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1990U 
We reverse and remand. ,^g»| 
FACTS - a | 
On the night of September 5 and the,, 
early morning hours of September 6, 1990^ 
three garages in and around a West Jordan ; 
subdivision in Salt Lake County were bur- ^ 
glarized. In response to a dispatch caH, 
Deputy Wayne Dial drove to the home of 
one of the victims, Sharon Gamboa. Mrs. 
Gamboa informed him that she had heard 
someone in the garage and, upon investiga-
tion, discovered that some items had been 
removed from the vehicles therein. The 
outside door to the garage was ajar, a 
screen had been cut from one of the garage 
windows, and the window had been opened. 
Mrs. Gamboa then described two men 
whom she had seen immediately thereafter 
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Cite as 834 PJ2d 592 (UtahApp. 1992) 
Utah 593 
19*" in the vicinity of her garage, walk 
-Boss her lawn, and proceed on a sidewalk 
gi front of her house. 
During a subsequent search of a ballpark 
gits located near Mrs. Gamboa's house, 
Deputy Dial found an unoccupied, parked 
T€hicle. He ran a license plate check, dis-
covered that the owner was Elna LaFreni-
ere, and requested that dispatch contact 
her. Deputy Dial then left the car and, 
with the assistance of four other officers, 
established a perimeter watch around the 
vehicle, covering the five exits from the 
ballpark area. Approximately ten minutes 
after establishing the perimeter, another 
officer, Deputy Robert Bobrowski, saw the 
taillights of the vehicle light up and move 
northbound across the lawn of the ballpark 
area. After further investigation, he dis-
covered tire tracks across the lawn from 
the spot where the vehicle had been 
parked. 
Dispatch contacted Mrs. LaFreniere and 
learned that she thought that the vehicle 
was in her garage but, upon looking, she 
discovered that both the vehicle and her 
grandson, Parker, were gone. Dispatch 
asked Mrs. LaFreniere if she wanted the 
vehicle reported as stolen, and she respond-
ed that she did not Dispatch relayed this 
information to Deputy Dial. Nevertheless, 
Corporal Troy Naylor was sent to Mrs. 
LaFreniere's home and spoke briefly with 
her concerning the absence of both her 
vehicle and her grandson. He then posi-
tioned his patrol car approximately two 
houses away from her house to await the 
vehicle's return. 
Ten to fifteen minutes later, Parker ar-
rived, driving his grandmothers vehicle. 
According to Corporal Naylor's estimate, 
Parker was driving at a speed of at least 
forty-five miles per hour in a twenty-five 
mile per hour zone. The vehicle skidded 
into the driveway, at which time Corporal 
Naylor radioed for a back-up and pulled his 
vehicle in behind Parker's vehicle to pre-
vent it from leaving. He unhoistered his 
gun and ordered Parker to exit his vehicle 
and stand up against it. After determining 
that Parker did not have any weapons on 
mm, Corporal Naylor handcuffed him and 
placed him under arrest Parker was put 
in the back seat of Deputy Troester's police 
vehicle, which had just arrived. Corporal 
Naylor requested and received permission 
from Parker's grandmother to search her 
vehicle. He found four flashlights in the 
vehicle, two of which Mrs. LaFreniere 
could not identify. 
Deputy Troester read Parker his rights, 
pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 
436, 86 S.Ct 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), 
and Parker indicated that he was unsure 
whether he wanted to talk to the officers. 
The deputy asked no further questions con-
cerning possible criminal activity, but did 
ask for basic information necessary to book 
Parker. Subsequently, from either the po-
lice radio or from the officers' conversa-
tions outside the police vehicle, Parker 
learned that his grandmother had told the 
officers about a friend of his, David Green. 
Parker then told Deputy Troester that he 
had been with Green and that they had 
committed the burglaries, and offered to 
take him to Green's apartment. Green was 
picked up, and the officers proceeded to 
Mrs. Gamboa's subdivision with Parker and 
Green. En route, Parker told Deputy 
Troester that he had two dollars in his 
pocket and that it was half of the money 
that he and Green had gotten that evening. 
Additionally, he pointed out the three ga-
rages that they had burglarized that night, 
explaining in two instances how they had 
entered and what they had taken. 
Upon their arrival at the Gamboa resi-
dence, Mrs. Gamboa positively identified 
Parker and Green as the individuals she 
had seen immediately following the burgla-
ry of her garage. Parker was taken to the 
Salt Lake County Jail and charged with 
three counts of burglary. Parker subse-
quently pleaded not guilty to the charges 
and moved to suppress all evidence seized 
following his arrest The matter was tried 
to the court, and Parker was found guilty 
as charged. 
The sole issue presented on appeal is 
whether the trial court erred in denying 
Parker's motion to suppress evidence of 
the three burglaries obtained subsequent 
to his arrest. Specifically, Parker argues 
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that the police did not have the requisite 
probable cause to arrest him, and that his 
subsequent statements were elicited in vio-
lation of his rights under Miranda and the 
Fifth Amendment The State responds 
that the police had probable cause to arrest 
him on the traffic violation, and that the 
conversation overheard by Parker did not 
amount to interrogation, and thus, Parker's 
statements were not obtained in violation 
of his right to remain silent. 
ANALYSIS 
"A trial court's findings of fact underly-
ing its decision to grant or deny a motion to 
suppress must be upheld unless they are 
clearly erroneous. However, we review 
the trial court's legal conclusions in re-
gards thereto under a correction of error 
standard." State v. Hunter, 831 P.2d 
1033, 1035 (Utah App.1992) (citing State v. 
Steward, 806 P.2d 213, 215 (Utah App. 
1991)). 
[1] We first address Parker's argument 
that the police lacked probable cause to 
arrest him after stopping him for the 
speeding violation. The Fourth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution pro-
vides that "the right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures shall not be violated^]" U.S. 
Const amend. IV. It is well settled that a 
police officer's stop of a vehicle is a "sei-
zure" and therefore subject to fourth 
amendment protections. See Delaware v. 
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S.Ct 1391, 
1396, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979); Sandy City v. 
Thorsness, 778 P.2d 1011, 1012 (Utah App. 
1989). However, the Fourth Amendment 
does not prohibit all seizures, but only un-
reasonable ones. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 
1, 9, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1873, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 
(1968). Since a traffic stop is a limited 
seizure and is more like an investigative 
detention than a custodial arrest, United 
States v. Walker, 933 F.2d 812, 815 (10th 
Cir.1991) (citing Berkemer v. McCarthy, 
468 U.S. 420, 439, 104 S.Ct 3138, 3149, 82 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 41-1-17 (1988) provides: 
The commission, and such officers and in-
spectors of the department as it shall desig-
L.Ed.2d 317 (1984)), we assess the ^ B 
ableness of such a stop under prmetfgfl 
governing investigative detentions^EB 
forth in Terry. Id. at 815 (titing-rjMjJ 
States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512&33 
(10th Cir.1988)). Under Terry, the d e t m S 
nation of whether a seizure is reasobaiiP 
involves a two-pronged test (1) Wa f^JUi 
officer's action justified at its inceptkm! 
and (2) Was his action reasonably relatetfw 
scope to the circumstances which jnatHCJj 
the interference in the first place? ftmPjj 
392 U.S. at 19-20, 88 S.Ct at 1879; aceartx 
State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431, 435 (Uffi 
App.1990). • «yj|j 
[2] As to whether Corporal Naylor's i £ 
tion was justified at its inception, we ha?v 
previously stated that a stop "can be justfe*! 
fied only upon a showing of reasonably 
suspicion that defendant had committed «£ 
was committing a crime or that he war" 
stopped incident to a traffic offense1^ 
Thorsness, 778 P.2d at 1012 (citation omit* 
ted); accord State v. Dorsey, 731 PJ2d[; 
1085, 1087 (Utah 1986); State v. Holme^ 
774 P.2d 506, 507-08 (Utah App.l989k 
State v. Baird, 763 P.2d 1214, 1216 (UtaT 
App.1988). "Whether there are objective: 
facts to justify such a stop depends on the. 
'totality of the circumstances.' " Holmes^ 
71A P.2d at 508 (quoting State v. Mendoza^ 
748 P.2d 181, 183 (Utah 1987)). Corporal 
Naylor's undisputed testimony was that 
Parker was driving at a speed of at least 
forty-five miles per hour in a twenty-five 
mile per hour zone. It is readily apparent 
from these facts that it was proper for 
Corporal Naylor to stop Parker. Thus, the 
initial stop was clearly justified in this case/ 
However, we cannot say that Corporal 
Naylor's actions following the stop of Par-
ker's vehicle were reasonably related in 
scope to the circumstances which justified 
the interference in the first place. Al-
though Utah Code Ann. § 41-1-17 (1988) 
grants police officers discretion to arrest 
individuals who violate any provision of the 
Motor Vehicle Act,1 we hold that, under the 
nate. peace officers, state patrolmen, and oth-
ers duly authorized by the department or by 
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circumstances of this case, the decision to 
i r Wst Parker was an abuse of that discre-
in regard to the length and scope of 
traffic stops, the Supreme Court has held 
that the detention "must be temporary and 
bst no longer than is necessary to effectu-
iie the purpose of the stop." Florida v. 
Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S.Ct 1319, 
1325, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983). Similarly, the 
Utah Supreme Court has stated that the 
length and scope of a detention for a traf-
fic violation "must be 'strictly tied to and 
justified by' the circumstances which ren-
dered its initiation permissible/' State v. 
Johnson, 805 P.2d 761, 763 (Utah 1991) 
(quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20, 88 S.Ct. 
at 1879); accord State v. Lovegren, 829 
P2d 155, 158 (Utah App.1992). Additional-
ly, this court, as well as other courts, has 
consistently held that "once the reasons for 
the initial stop of the vehicle have been 
completed, the occupants must be allowed 
to proceed on their way." Lovegren, 829 
P.2d at 158. "Any further temporary de-
tention for investigative questioning after 
the fulfillment of the purpose for the initial 
traffic stop is justified under the fourth 
amendment only if the detaining officer 
has a reasonable suspicion of serious crimi-
nal activity." Id. (quoting State v. Robin-
son. 797 P.2d 431, 435 (Utah App.1990)); 
accord Walker, 933 F.2d at 816; Guzman, 
864 F.2d at 1519. "Whether reasonable 
suspicion exists depends upon the 'totality 
of the circumstances.'" Lovegren, 829 
P.2d at 158 (citations omitted). 
[3] Our analysis therefore centers on 
whether Corporal Naylor had a reasonable 
articulable suspicion of criminal activity be-
iaw shall have power and it shall be their 
dutv 
(b) To make arrests upon view and without 
warrant for any violation committed in their 
presence of any of the provisions of this act or 
other law regulating the operation of vehicles 
or the use of the highways. 
Id. (emphasis added). However, section 41-1-
17 also provides that an officer may alternative-
lv inmate the more usual traffic stop: 
(c) When on duty, upon reasonable belief 
that any vehicle is being operated in violation 
of any provision of this act or of any other 
law regulating the operation of vehicles to 
yond the traffic offense justifying further 
detention of Parker and his ultimate arrest 
Such is clearly lacking here. At the time 
that Corporal Naylor stopped Parker, the 
only fact known to the officer that even 
remotely tied Parker to the burglaries was 
the presence of the vehicle he was driving 
in a ball field near where one of the crimes 
occurred. It is axiomatic that presence at 
or near the scene of a crime, without more, 
does not give rise to a reasonable suspicion 
of criminal activity. See Brovrn v. Texas, 
443 U.S. 47, 52, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 2641, 61 
L.Ed.2d 357 (1979); State v. Carpena, 714 
P.2d 674, 675 (Utah 1986) (per curiam); 
Steward, 806 P.2d at 216. 
[4] In fact, it is difficult to imagine any 
circumstances surrounding a routine traffic 
stop m which the actions taken by Corporal 
Naylor in this case would be justified.2 
After witnessing Parker speed into his 
grandmother's driveway, Corporal Naylor 
pulled his vehicle behind Parker's, unhol-
stered his gun, removed Parker from his 
vehicle, handcuffed him, and placed him 
under arrest. There is no evidence that 
Parker was making any attempt at escape; 
to the contrary, the vehicle was in neutral 
and pointed toward the garage. At this 
point, Corporal Naylor had no reasonable 
articulable suspicion that Parker had com-
mitted or was about to commit a crime. 
Under the circumstances present here, it is 
patently offensive to suggest that a police 
officer acting as Corporal Naylor did here 
was within the realm of discretion granted 
to police officers under the law. Accord-
ingly, we hold that Corporal Naylor's ac-
require the driver thereof to stop, exhibit his 
drivers license and the registration card issued 
for the vehicles and submit to an inspection of 
such vehicle, the registration plates and regis-
tration card thereon. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
2. We do not, however, express any opinion as to 
the appropnateness of arrest in those situations 
in which extenuating circumstances remove a 
traffic stop from the realm of a "routine" traffic 
stop, such as leading the police on a high speed 
chase or driving under the influence of alcohol 
or drugs. 
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tdons were not reasonable in light of the 
facts in this case.3 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred in denying Parker's 
motion to suppress evidence of the three 
burglaries obtained subsequent to the stop 
for the speeding violation. Accordingly, 
the denial of that motion and Parker's con-
viction are reversed, and this matter is 
remanded for further proceedings consist-
ent with this opinion. 
BILLINGS and JACKSON, JJ., concur. 
( O | KEY NUMBER SYSTEM > 
Joanne HOLLAND, Petitioner, 
v. 
STATE OFFICE OF EDUCATION, 
DIVISION OF REHABILITATION 
SERVICES, Respondent 
No. 910409-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
June 12, 1992. 
Handicapped person challenged state 
agency's denial of reimbursement for 
transportation costs associated with voca-
tional rehabilitation. The Court of Ap-
peals, Garff, J., held that federal education 
assistance, including Pell Grant, which 
handicapped person qualified for after 
state agency had developed plan under 
which person would receive benefits for 
educational rehabilitation services in order 
to attend university, constituted "compara-
ble benefits" requiring agency to deny per-
son reimbursement for transportation 
costs. 
Affirmed. 
3. Since Parker's sutements must be suppressed 
because they were made during the course of 
what we have already concluded to be an im-
proper arrest, we do not address Parkers sec-
1. United States e=»82(2) - « 4 i 
State agency providing vocational 
habitation services for handicapped n^ 
sons has discretion to determine whetfca 
comparable benefits must be utffizefct 
whole or in part to meet cost of sudtTgi 
vices; so long as agency reasonably exm 
cises such discretion, its decision win k 
affirmed. Higher Education Act of ]££{ 
§ 401(b), as amended, 20 UJS.QJ 
§ 1070(b). /. 4g,| 
2. United States <s=»82(2) ' ^ 
Federal education assistance, includinj 
Pell Grant, which handicapped person qua] 
ified for after state agency had develop* 
plan under which person would receive bea 
efits for educational rehabilitation service 
in order to attend university, constitute 
"comparable benefits" requiring agency U 
deny person reimbursement for transporta 
tion costs; Pell Grant, in amount of $28 
per month during academic year, could IN 
spent on education costs, including tram 
portation costs, and person's transportatioi 
expenses amounted to approximately $2K 
per month. Higher Education Act of 196SJ 
§§ 401(b), 411F(5)(A, B), as amended,. 21 
U.S.C.A. §§ 1070(b), 1070a-6(5KAt B). "~j 
See publication Words and Phrases j j 
for other judicial constructions and_. 
definitions. "* 
^M 
Robert B. Denton (argued) Legal CentH 
for People With Disabilities, Salt Lake CStf* 
for petitioner. '" ^ 
R. Paul Van Dam, State Atty. Gen. «d 
John S. McAllister, Asst Atty. Gen. (tr; 
gued), Salt Lake City, for respondent "! 
Before GARFF, GREENWOOD and * 
RUSSON, JJ. ^ 
OPINION 
GARFF, Judge: * 
Joanne Holland petitions this court & 
review a determination by a fair hearfflf 
ond claim that his subsequent statements **J 
elicited in violation of his rights under Aft—*• 
and the Fifth Amendment. 
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Attorney for Defendant 
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424 East 500 South, Suite, 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
U t O *- w w J n 
AUG 20 II 13 AH'& 
-:.CT 
BY _ . 
"' CLERK 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE S^ TATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
£-*%. 
TODD PARKER, 
Defendant. 
MOTION FOR RETURN OF FINE, 
COSTS AND FEES AND NOTICE 
OF HEARING 
Case No. 901901633FS 
HONORABLE HOMER F. WILKINSON 
MOTION 
COMES NOW the defendant above named by and through his 
attorney of record LISA J. REMAL, and hereby moves this court to 
order the return of any fines, costs and fees he paid as part of his 
sentence in the above-entitled case. Grounds for this motion are 
that the defendant's conviction was overturned by the Utah Court of 
Appeals and his case was thereafter dismissed. It is, therefore, in 
the interest of justice that all fines, costs and fees paid by the 
defendant be returned to him. 
DATED this u K day of August, 1992. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED: 
TlfX V V & M / 
LISA J. REMAL 
Attorney foir Defendant 
flf>53 
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Telephone: 532-5444 
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Ge^-iy Cieflc 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
TODD ALLEN PARKER, 
Defendant. 
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
FOR RETURN OF FINE, COSTS AND 
FEES 
Case No. 901901633FS 
HONORABLE HOMER F. WILKINSON 
Based upon the defendant's motion for return of fines, 
costs and fees which was heard on the dates of September 4, 1992 and 
September 15, 1992, and good cause appearing; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that fines shall be returned to the 
defendant but any money paid for rehabilitation will not be returned 
to the defendant. 
DATED this / y day of October, 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
HONORABLE HOMER F. WILKINSON 
Third District Court 
DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the office of the 
South Valley County Attorney, 2001 South State Street, Suite S-3700, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200, this }lj ' day of October, 1992. 
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rs In This Division Not 
boveOial-
-530-6733 
-530-6514 
-530-6536 
-530-6990 
530-6628 
— See Public Service Commission 
ihrrsion of — — - 530-67471 
tegistration* 
rtion • 
Vehicles -
nsionof — 
a Division c 
-530-6747 
-S30-6727 
-530-6600 
-530-6651 
-530-6662 
-530-6652 vpiamts-
:ODE 
tan State C ^ 
rtment Division of Corporations A 
Commercial Code 
4 EXECUTIVE 
ATION StateCjoJtoiBMe -538-1028 
VE DISORDERS— 
584-8215 
H Building 538-6165 
ECONOMIC 
J«T DEPARTMENT— 
-538-8700 
-538-8883 
uitteSOO 
rffice-
>uite500 
Office r_ 
•uiteSOO 
vewoment Division — 538-8722 
urteSOO 
wed On Nest Column 
CONTRACTORS UCENSING 
See Utah State C 
Department Drvtsion of Occupational A 
Professional Licensing 
CORPORATIONS 
See Utah State Government Commerce 
Department Division of Corporations A 
Commexoel Code 
CORRECTIONS DEPARTMENT-6100 S * 5 
300EAST— m 
Administration 6100 S 300 East Murrey— 265-5500 
Adult Probation A Parole— 
Fermington Office 99 S Maw rrmnew -451-5001 
Sett Lake Office 275 E 200 South— 
AumwmliifJon 533-4984 
Orcurt Court Supervision 533-5501 
Cueamunrty Service 533-5545 
District Court Supervision 533-5501 
Intensive Supervision Parote —— S33-60S5 
Intensive Supervision Probation -533-5501 
Parole Supervision ^ " J S S J 
Presentence Investigation *-~^—•—533-4929 
Tooele Office 255 S100 East 
Tooae—Salt Lake OtyTelNo- -521-2070 
Community Coriectional Centers *' 
Bonneville Community Center 
Fremont Community Center 
2588 W 2365 Soutn w v J y Q y — — 
t Street Community Center 
Second Judiael District Court— 
Fermington Oepei tinerrt** 
Justice Complei-800 W S t a t e -
Child Support 451-4403 
Chnl 451-4401 
Criminal 451-4405 
Domestic Relations 451-4401 
-451-4410 
-451-4440 
Judge Cornaby Douglas L -
Judge Page Rodney S 
MicheelAilplun-
Scheduling • 
-451-4430 
-451-4404 
-451-4400 
Second District Juvenile Court 
Fermmgton 447 w 675 Worm frmnetn 451-2232 
Third District Juvenile Court— 
3522 S700 West 265-5900 
McCuRySP Judge — 
Christaan AG Judge -
Matheson FB Judge -
Johansson 0 A Judge 
BhreHRWC 
Office of Court Executive -
Salt Lake County Attorney -
Accounting — — — — 
Records — — 
-265-5963 
-265-5969 
-265-5972 
-265-5974 
-265-5966 
-265-5911 
-265-5939 
-265-5932 
-265-5933 
-265-5913 
-265-5935 
-265-5901 
aOOranee 
-538-8829 
Women's Community Center 
322E300 Soutn 
-533-6360 
-364-1658 
Unit 
1424PS Pony EwrcsKM Draper 576-7000 
Technical Services 265-5500 
Continued On Next Column 
Collection Department 
Truancy Court 
Juvemw Probation Off ices-
East Office 525 E 4500 Soutn Murray — 262-6053 
Surte F-100 
Serf Lake Office 533-5657 
205 W 700 South Suite 304 
West office 969-6282 
2964 W 4700 South Surte 111 
West Valley Gty 
Continued On Next Column 
UTAH STATE GOVEWtMEHT— 
COURTS— 
-265-5500 
•571-3090 
Prison Staff Training Center 
14271S State Draper 
Utah State Prison 
144J0 SPuwrfcjweuftdOnoT 576-7000 
Woaean/s Correctional Fecdity 
576-7000 
576-7000 
UtahCbrrectiorial Industries Onm -571-9269 
IK3 Showroom 133E2D0So«tH 359-5906 
COSMETOLOGY UCENSING 
See Utah State Govormnont Conuuorco 
~~i DegartnrnmDrwswnof Occupational A-
COURTS— 
-578-3800 
-521-3911 
-538-1044 
Office • 
3636 S Constitution 8»vd Suite 
201 West VeWeyOty 
Tosea Office 47 S Man Ta 
GROAT COURTS— 
Third Orcurt Courts— 
-969-9904 
Civil-
Small Claims • 
SaaaM Claims Filing 
Instructions-—-
Traffic 
* r y -
-533-3911 
-533-3921 
-533-3914 
AsstOerk of The Court 
Court Executive and Clerk of 
Court 
-533-3910 
-533-3901 
-533-3939 
-533-3980 
-533-3980 
Fechs Dennis M < 
Clerk-
iWIUWKJS micnaei u • 
Clerk-
McOeveSheHaK-
Clerk-
Oerk-
PMIipK-
Clerk-
W-
-533-3900 
-533-3980 
-533-3900 
-533-3980 
-533-3900 
-533-3980 
-533-3900 
-533-3980 
Sandy Oepertmerrr-440 East 8680 
-533-3900 
-533-3980 
AsstOerk of Court -
Court Executive and Clerk of 
Court 
-533-7884 
-533-7885 
-533-7887 
-533-7883 
-533*7888 
-533-7884 
-533-3980 
Livingston Roger A • 
Oerfc-
Waet Valley 0*oertment-3636S 
-S33-733S 
-533-7335 
Oerks Office— 
Traffic • 
Jury-
t Oerfc of Court-
Court Executive and Oerk of 
Court 
-533-7889 
-533-7889 
-533-7889 
-533-7889 
-533-5939 
-533-7889 
-533-3980 
Medley Tyrone E * 
Oerfc-
Thorne William A«lr-
dark 
Oerfc-
Second Orcurt Courts-
Bountiful Department- 745 South 
-533-7889 
-533-7889 
-533-7889 
-S33-7889 
-533-7889 
-533-7889 
Traffic Oerfc-
OvdOerk 
-298-6150 
CreajnaiADUiOerfc 
Chief Oerfc • 
Jury Duty -
-298-6151 
-296-6152 
-298-6153 
-298-6154 
AdBMnstralion 745 5 Man 8ndl— 
ex unent" 425 N 
HOrl 
Traffic -
CriniHiei-
-298-6153 
-298-6160 
SmoMOaimsAGvil 
Junes-
-546-2484 
-544-2201 
Sunset Department 
S5W1B00Norm Sunset 
CRIME VICTIM REPARATIONS OFFICE 
-544-3403 
825-3303 
350E50OSQ** 
ToJIFree-OieJlATfcen-
-533-4000 
CRIMINAL AND JUVENILE JUSTICE 
iQl Sta»C*g*o) • 
-800621-7444 
-538-1031 
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS BUREAU -263-1363 
Corrtmued On Next Pane 
